13:10 - 13:55 |
Yoh Iwasa: Persistence of corruption: an evolutionary game theory motivated by illegal logging in tropics ↓ Illegal logging is a serious threat to plantations in the tropics. Here, we study the coupled dynamics of Social-Ecological systems shedding light of two different aspects.
[1] We examined the roles of profit-sharing in plantation management strategy in a dynamic game model. The model assumes that the owner chooses the age of the trees to be harvested and the local people choose their level of monitoring effort to prevent illegal logging with surveillance. After the trees are removed, the owner hires local people to replant young trees. Dynamic optimization analysis revealed that, under the pressure of illegal logging, the owner may find it profitable to share harvesting profits with the local people to enhance their surveillance effort. The profit-sharing rate optimal to the owner depends on the rate of natural disturbance, faster future discount rate, and a higher cost of replanting.
[2] Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution’s integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game theory, using analytical methods and numerical simulations, and find that it leads to sustained or damped oscillations. The results confirm the view that corruption is endemic and transparency a major factor in reducing it.
Lee, J-H., Y. Kubo, T. Fujiwara, R.M. Septianad, S. Riyantod, and Y. Iwasa. 2018. Profit sharing as a management strategy for a state-owned teak plantation at high risk for illegal logging. Ecological Economics 149, 140-148.
Lee, J-H, Y. Iwasa, U. Dieckmann, and K. Sigmund. 2019 Social evolution leads to persistent corruption. PNAS 116, 13276-13281. (Online) |
14:00 - 14:30 |
Christopher Heggerud: Coupling the socio-economic and ecological dynamics of cyanobacteria ↓ Cyanobacterial (CB) blooms are becoming a global concern due to the increasing prevalence of eutrophication. The dependence of CB dynamics on phosphorus and light inputs is modeled via a stoichiometric approach and the transient dynamics are discussed. We then couple the CB model to a socio-economic model governing the anthropogenic nutrient inputs. We assume that the human population is made up of cooperators and defectors and that each strategy has an associated cost dependent on social pressure and norms, concern for CB, and effort. We find that the human population at a single lake exhibits bistability. Further, in considering a network of lakes the level of cooperation is highly dependent on social norms. (Online) |
15:00 - 15:45 |
Eli Fenichel: Getting human behavior into epidemiology models ↓ Infectious disease modeling efforts are emblematic of the challenges of modeling coupled human-environmental systems. These challenges exist conceptually, theoretically, and empirically, and are made more challenging by disciplinary norms. COVID-19 has pumped substantial amounts of energy into interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches to epidemiological modeling. However, I see many of the over-simplifications, related to challenges we have struggled with for over 10 years, finding their way into high profile reports and publications that are guiding policy response. The challenges start with implicit disciplinary disagreement about what is being modeled and why. They are further complicated by scaling issues, which are tightly connected to disciplinary views of model assessment that point back to the reasons for modeling. In this talk, I will describe my lessons learned and outline a research program for couple human-epidemiological modeling going forward with the goal of providing insights for other human-environmental modeling and for public health. (Online) |
15:50 - 16:20 |
Rebecca Tyson: CHANS with Opinion Dynamics ↓ CHANS models frequently incorporate the human component using a game theoretic framework. In this work, we present a different approach where opinion dynamics are modeled explicitly, giving us access to social behaviours such as amplification and polarization. We study the behaviour of the opinion dynamics in isolation, and then couple them to disease dynamics to study the interaction
between the two. We propose that our approach allows for the inclusion of human behaviours that are difficult to access via traditional CHANS modelling, and that might have important consequences for the management of ecological systems.
Co-Authors: Noah Marshall, Stephen M. Krone, Bert O. Baumgaertner (Online) |