

Formalized Brouwerian Real Analysis using the Nuprl proof assistant


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Implementing Mathematics with The Nuprl Proof Development System By the PRL Group:

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- Inspired by the work of Errett Bishop and with NSF funding to implement *proofs-as-programs*, Bob Constable and his group at Cornell developed Nuprl, a proof assistant now based on extensional, constructive type theory.
- We have formalized all of Chapter 2 of Bishop and Bridges, *Constructive Analysis* in Nuprl.



- From studying Kleene we became convinced that both bar induction and the continuity principle should be true in Nuprl and that they would be very useful for formalizing constructive analysis.
- In the last few years we have formalized the semantics of Nuprl in Coq. This allowed us to extend Nuprl in new ways and formally confirm our conviction.
 - We added named exceptions and a “fresh” name binding operation, and proved rules for reasoning about them. These allow us to prove a *strong continuity principle* for Nuprl.
 - We added a version of *free choice sequences* to the Nuprl semantics. This allows us to justify a strong *bar induction* rule, and use that rule to prove a general form of *bar recursion*.
- Using these new features we prove Brouwer’s theorem that all real functions on a proper, compact interval are continuous. This allows us to simplify several aspects of our formalization of *Constructive Analysis*.



Nuprl in a nutshell

Nuprl built its own programming logic and later evolved towards the work of Per Martin-Löf. The basic concept is $x = y \in T$ where x and y are *terms* and T is a *type*.

Computation comes first: the terms are definitional extensions of a primitive, untyped programming language that includes

- numbers and tokens: $\dots, -1, 0, 1, 2, \dots$, 'abc', \dots
- $\lambda x.t$, $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle$, $inl\ t$, $inr\ t$, $+$, $*$, $-$, div , rem
- $t_1(t_2)$, $spread(t_1; a, b.t_2)$, $decide(t_1; a.t_2; b.t_3)$, **fix** F
- exceptions, $try?catch$, $\nu x.t$, and several more

We then define $t_1 \mapsto t_2$ (*computes to*) and $t_1 \sim t_2$ (computational bi-simulation).

A *type* T “is” a partial equivalence relation R_T on terms that respects the bi-simulation relation. Then $x \in T$ if $(x R_T x)$ and $x = y \in T$ if $(x R_T y)$.

Every type is a member of a *universe* \mathbb{U}_i where $i \in 0, 1, 2, \dots$



Nuprl is an extensional type theory

- Nuprl is *extensional*: if $x = y \in A$ and $A = B \in \mathbb{U}$; then $x = y \in B$.
- Nuprl has many types: quotients $x, y. T // E(x, y)$, intersection $\bigcap_{x:A} B(x)$, “partial” types \overline{T} where **fix** $(\lambda x. x) = \perp \in \overline{T} \dots$
- The same term can be proved to have many different types.
- Type membership is undecidable, so there is no type-checking algorithm.
- Function extensionality:
 $f = g \in x : A \rightarrow B(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall x : A. f(x) = g(x) \in B(x)$
- Nuprl is expressive enough to formalize category theory and (the semantics of) homotopy type theory – viz. Cubical type theory.



- The “set” type $\{x : T \mid P(x)\}$ is the subtype of $x \in T$ for which $P(x)$ is true.
 - A member x of $\{x : T \mid P(x)\}$ does not “come with” a proof of $P(x)$.
 - This type is useful mainly when $P(x)$ is “squash stable” – we can construct a witness for $P(x)$ from x when we know only that $P(x)$ is true (i.e inhabited).
 - This allows us to omit unneeded evidence.
- $\downarrow T$, the “squash” of type T is $\{x : \mathit{Unit} \mid T\}$
 - $\downarrow T$ is inhabited if and only if T is inhabited, but it contains no other information (about what terms inhabit T).



- $\downarrow T$, the “truncation” of T is the quotient type $T//\mathbf{true}$
 - The inhabitants of $\downarrow T$ are the same as the inhabitants of T , but they are all equal.
 - $\downarrow T$ can express the existence of something of type T that is not extensional w.r.t. its parameters.
- The *choice principle* for type T is
$$\forall P: T \rightarrow \mathbb{P}. (\forall x: T. \downarrow P[x]) \Leftrightarrow \downarrow (\forall x: T. P[x])$$
- In Nuprl we can prove
 - The choice principle is true for \mathbb{N} and for $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$
 - The choice principle is false for $(\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$



How does Nuprl prove Brouwer's theorem?

- It satisfies both weak and strong forms of the *continuity principle* for numbers.
 - Let $\mathcal{B} = \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ and $\mathbb{N}_n = \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$
 - If $F \in \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ then
- weak** $\forall f : \mathcal{B}. \downarrow \exists n : \mathbb{N}. \forall g : \mathcal{B}. F(g) = F(f)$ if $(f = g \in \mathbb{N}_n \rightarrow \mathbb{N})$
- strong** $\downarrow \exists M : n : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow (\mathbb{N}_n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (\mathbb{N} \cup \text{Unit}). \forall f : \mathcal{B}. (\downarrow \exists n : \mathbb{N}. M(n, f) = F(f)) \wedge (\forall n : \mathbb{N}. M(n, f) = F(f) \text{ if } M(n, f) \in \mathbb{N})$
- Nuprl has two (and only two) induction principles
 - Induction on \mathbb{N}
 - Bar Induction
- Using Bar Induction we prove FAN, and from FAN and the strong continuity principle we prove Brouwer's theorem that all functions from $[0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ are uniformly continuous.



The constructive real numbers

$$\mathbb{R} = \{r : \mathbb{N}^+ \rightarrow \mathbb{Z} \mid \forall n, m : \mathbb{N}. |n * r(m) - m * r(n)| \leq 2(n + m)\}$$

then $\left| \frac{r(n)}{2n} - \frac{r(m)}{2m} \right| \leq \frac{1}{n} + \frac{1}{m}$

so $\lambda n. \frac{r(n)}{2n}$ is Bishop's regular

$$(r = s) = \forall n. |r(n) - s(n)| \leq 4$$

$$(r < s) = \exists n. r(n) + 4 < s(n)$$

$$(r \neq s) = (r < s) \vee (s < r)$$

$$Fun(f, I) = \forall x, y : \{r : \mathbb{R} \mid r \in I\}. (x = y) \Rightarrow (f(x) = f(y))$$

$$SFun(f, I) = \forall x, y : \{r : \mathbb{R} \mid r \in I\}. (f(x) \neq f(y)) \Rightarrow (x \neq y)$$



Brouwer's theorem

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cont}(f, I) &= \forall \epsilon > 0. \exists \delta > 0. \forall x, y: \{r: \mathbb{R} \mid r \in I\}. \\ & \quad |x - y| \leq \delta \Rightarrow |f(x) - f(y)| \leq \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 1: $\forall a, b: \mathbb{R}. (a < b) \Rightarrow (\text{Cont}(f, [a, b]) \Leftrightarrow \text{Fun}(f, [a, b]))$

Theorem 2: $\forall a, b: \mathbb{R}. (a \leq b) \Rightarrow (\text{Cont}(f, [a, b]) \Leftrightarrow \text{SFun}(f, [a, b]))$



Bar Induction Rule

$$H \vdash T \in \text{Type} \quad (1)$$

$$H, n:\mathbb{N}, s : (\mathbb{N}_n \rightarrow T) \vdash B(n, s) \vee \neg B(n, s) \quad (2)$$

$$H, a:(\mathbb{N} \rightarrow T) \vdash \downarrow \exists n:\mathbb{N}. B(n, a) \quad (3)$$

$$H, n:\mathbb{N}, s:(\mathbb{N}_n \rightarrow T), x:B(n, s) \vdash f(n, s) \in X(n, s) \quad (4)$$

$$H, n:\mathbb{N}, s:(\mathbb{N}_n \rightarrow T), x:P \vdash f(n, s) \in X(n, s) \quad (5)$$

$$P = \forall t:T. f(n+1, s.t) \in X(n+1, s.t)$$

$$s.t = \lambda m. \text{if } m = n \quad \text{then } t \text{ else } s(m) \quad (6)$$

$$H \vdash f(0, c) \in X(0, c) \quad (7)$$



The continuity principle is constructive

- For $F \in \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $\bullet \in Unit$ the constructive content of strong continuity is an $M_F \in n : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow (\mathbb{N}_n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (\mathbb{N} \cup Unit)$
- $M_F = \lambda n, f. \nu e. (F(\bar{f})?e : \bullet)$ where $\bar{f}(x) = \text{if } x < 0 \text{ then } \perp$ else if $x < n$ then $f(x)$ else *exception*($e; \bullet$)
- Kreisel and others (e.g. Escardo and Xu) have shown that no such M can be extensional. This means that extensionally equal $F = G \in \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ can have $M_F(n, f) \neq M_G(n, f)$.
- We can (and must) truncate the strong continuity proposition.
- The truncated version is still strong enough for many purposes, in particular, Brouwer's theorem.



How do we know that Nuprl is consistent?

- Doug Howe defined the $t_1 \sim t_2$ (computational bi-simulation) relation and proved its crucial properties.
- Stuart Allen gave an "inductive-recursive" definition of the partial equivalence relation semantics for the types in a Nuprl universe. He then converted this into a recursive definition. Using this semantics he defined the truth of a Nuprl sequent $H \models C \text{ ext } t$.
- Vincent Rahli and Abhishek Anand have formalized all of this in Coq and proved (most of) the rules of Nuprl (work still ongoing).
- Bar Induction is powerful enough to prove that the predicative part of Coq is consistent. Therefore its soundness proof needs some more powerful principle. We used $P \vee \neg P$ in the impredicative *Prop* universe. *We believe bar induction for other reasons due to Brouwer and Kleene.*

